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A View From the Inside: Working With President
Truman on the Steel Seizure Case
Milton Kayle, Esq. *
When President Harry Truman left the White House in 1953,
his approval rating was under 30 percent, reflecting the public's
negative reaction to conditions prevailing at that time. Forty-
seven year later, in a C-Span survey of fifty-seven historians re-
garding presidential leadership, Harry Truman ranked fifth be-
hind Abraham Lincoln, Franklin Roosevelt, George Washington
and Theodore Roosevelt, in that order. This confirms that only
with the passage of time should one seek to evaluate the legacy of
a President of the United States.
How fortunate, therefore, that the Duquesne University School
of Law decided to undertake a 50-year retrospective dealing with
President Truman and the Steel Seizure case. It has afforded
those of us who played some part in the event the opportunity to
go on record regarding that participation. It has also allowed us to
present observations and insights that will be available in review-
ing President Truman's role in the steel seizure episode. Indeed,
thanks to this retrospective study, we too have had the benefit of
time in reassessing the events leading to this judicial challenge of
presidential authority.
As a lawyer, I worked for President Truman during the final
two years of his administration, with the title of Special Assistant
in the White House Office. I reported to two men, Charles Mur-
phy, the President's Counsel, and Dave Stowe, an Administrative
Assistant with primary responsibilities in the labor field. Both of
these men would participate in the early morning Oval Office staff
meeting during which the President would discuss the events of
the day and give assignments to the staff members. He would, in
turn, be briefed on matters of immediate concern by those present.
In other words, Harry Truman was very much a hands-on presi-
dent.
* Milton Kayle served as a Special Assistant to President Truman during the
Steel Seizure case.
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As Ken Hechler pointed out in the Panel discussions, President
Truman, an avid reader of history in his youth, brought to his of-
fice a profound knowledge of, and respect for, the office of the
presidency. Consequently, the attribution to him of demeaning
that office by his conduct in the steel seizure case, as alleged by
some of his critics, flies in the face of reality.
One aspect of the panel's presentation that was of particular in-
terest to me was Chief Justice Rehnquist's observation that the
Supreme Court in 1952 was affected by public opinion in deciding
to entertain cases presented for its consideration. How ironic it
was, therefore, that the very steps being taken by the Administra-
tion to contain the potential crisis in steel production would only
add fuel to the fire of negative publicity being organized and pro-
moted by industry.
In our panel discussions, David Feller, who had served as a un-
ion lawyer, pointed out that this controversy was not basically a
labor dispute. It was a contest over the price of steel, which if
granted in the amount sought by industry, would have under-
mined the economic stabilization program then in effect. More-
over, there were other conditions prevailing at the time of the sei-
zure that were bound to have a negative effect on public opinion.
These included the reckless charges by Senator McCarthy of
communism in the government and allegations of petty graft on
the part of the White House personnel. In addition, as a conse-
quence of President Truman's efforts to rid the Internal Revenue
System of corruption in its regional offices, already receiving wide
coverage in the press, the Justice Department, which had the re-
sponsibility of enforcing the law, was being run by an Acting At-
torney General. Finally, the public was weary of price and wide
controls reimposed during the Korean War after the long period of
similar regulation in World War II. All of these circumstances
would only enhance the likelihood that the Supreme Court would
entertain the case on an accelerated basis, which indeed proved to
be the case.
There is another reason to welcome the advent of the Steel Sei-
zure Retrospective. It has enabled us to make clear that the ad-
ministration's objective at the outset was to let industry know that
it could not sit back in reliance on the government's need to invoke
the emergency provisions of the Taft Hartley Act or other statu-
tory seizure provisions with their complicated and indecisive en-
forcement consequences. While we were aware of the possibility of
a negative decision by the Supreme Court if the case were to reach
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that level, there was a good chance that in the industry's pursuit
of injunctive relief, the issue of the constitutional basis of the gov-
ernment's action in the first instance would not be raised. How-
ever, if the matter did reach the Supreme Court, the President
and key members of the White House staff felt the government
would prevail.
In fact, I sent a memorandum to Dave Stowe on April 1, 1952,
which pointed out the questionable legal basis of seizure. Clearly
the President and his advisors had been made aware of a possible
adverse ruling by the Supreme Court. However, none of us could
have predicted the negative developments that took place in Judge
David Pine's Federal District Court where industry sought injunc-
tive relief against the seizure.
In the first place, cases of this nature are usually decided on
the principles of equitable jurisprudence in which there is a bal-
ancing of interests, consequently there was no need to raise the
issue of the merits of the case. Here the damage to the public in-
terest in the cessation of steel production during the Korean War
far outweighed the potential monetary losses to the industry.
Those losses could be readily ascertained by the maintenance of
separate books of records while management continued daily op-
eration of the steel mills. Certainly the government could have
reimbursed the industry for any losses alleged to have been sus-
tained.
Unfortunately for the government, developments in Judge
Pine's court proved disastrous. Holmes Baldridge, Assistant At-
torney General in charge of the Claims Division, initially made the
mistake of emphasizing in his brief the President's inherent con-
stitutional power to seize private property in times of national
emergency. He compounded this misadventure by claiming in oral
argument that there was no power in the courts to restrain the
President's exercise of this power, which could only be challenged
"by the ballot box and impeachment." He literally goaded the
judge into ruling on the merits and raising the constitutional law
issue, much to the surprise and delight of industry lawyers, as
confirmed by Stanley Temko, the industry attorney who was a
fellow member of our panel. In taking this action, Judge Pine also
failed to follow the traditional judicial practice of avoiding litiga-
tion on any constitutional law question, if at all possible. In sum,
the developments in Judge Pine's court virtually guaranteed a




One other aspect of the Steel Retrospective merits consideration
because it confirmed how close we came to settling this contro-
versy without a final resolution by a Supreme Court ruling.
As Dave Feller pointed out in the panel discussions, after losing
in Judge Pine's court, the government went to the Court of Ap-
peals to ask for a stay of the District Court's order granting the
injunction. The Court of Appeals, in turn, reversed Judge Pine's
decision, and in doing so, refused to enjoin the Secretary of Com-
merce from making any changes in hours or wages. Following this
ruling, the President called the parties to the White House and
claimed the Secretary was going to make changes that neither
party would like. This caused the parties to start negotiating, and
in due course, Arthur Goldberg, counsel to the union, authorized
Feller to begin drafting the settlement documents. However,
when word came down that the Supreme Court had granted in-
dustry's petition for certiorari, in which the government was pre-
vented from making changes in terms and conditions of employ-
ment, industry no longer had any incentive to continue with the
settlement negotiations. But for that speedy intervention by the
Supreme Court, the Steel Retrospective would never have taken
place!
As Ken Gormley, a professor at Duquesne University School of
Law, observed in our panel discussion, historians like to say that
President Truman got bad advice from his advisors in the steel
case. Moreover, President Truman's major biographers criticize
him for acting either recklessly, impulsively or without sound rea-
soning in his handling of the steel production crisis. Also, some of
them either ignore the crucial developments that took place in
Judge Pine's court or fail to recognize the key role Judge Pine
played in causing this constitutional challenge.
I submit that these characterizations of President Truman's
conduct do not do justice to the personal qualities he brought to
the office and his methods of operation in meeting his presidential
responsibilities. In addition, these critics of the President fail to
acknowledge the government's plan of action that might well have
avoided the constitutional challenge.
President Truman's role in this epic struggle will not be listed
as one of his major achievements during his term of office. How-
ever, the Steel Retrospective has enabled us to amplify the record
of this handling of this crisis. Such being the case, historians in
the future may well find reason to list this episode on the positive,
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rather than the negative side of the ledger of the presidency of
Harry S. Truman.

